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What Types of Diversity Benefit Workers? Empirical Evidence on the 
Effects of Co-Worker Dissimilarity on the Performance of Employees  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the consequences of grouping workers into diverse divisions on the 
performance of employees using a dataset containing the detailed personnel records of a large 
U.S. firm from 1989-1994.  In particular, I examine the effects of demographic dissimilarity 
among co-workers, namely differences in age, gender and race among employees who work 
together within divisions, and non-demographic dissimilarity, namely differences in education, 
work function, firm tenure, division tenure, performance and wages among employees within 
divisions.  I find evidence that age dissimilarity, dissimilarity in firm tenure, and performance 
dissimilarity are associated with lower worker performance, while wage differences are 
associated with higher worker performance.  My analysis also reveals that the effects of certain 
types of dissimilarities get smaller in magnitude the longer a worker is a part of a division.  
Finally, the paper provides evidence that the relationships between performance and the various 
measures of dissimilarity vary by occupational area and division size. 
 
 
 2 
Employees react to the demographic, wage and skill characteristics of the other members 
of their work-groups, thus accurate information about the effects of within-work-group 
differences is a crucial element in firms‟ decisions on how to organize their workers.  The idea 
that worker heterogeneities can benefit firm production goes back to Adam Smith (1776: 17-20).  
However, few economists have empirically studied the effects of work-group diversity on 
worker incentives, productivity, or performance, largely due to the dearth of appropriate datasets 
containing information on work-groups in conjunction with the characteristics of the workers 
that comprise them.  This study uses a novel dataset containing the detailed personnel records of 
a large vertically-integrated U.S. firm in the health services industry from 1989-1994 to study the 
impact of worker dissimilarity within organizational divisions.  What happens when employees 
working together in the same division are different from one another?  To what extent is 
diversity performance enhancing, or conversely, performance reducing?  Do different kinds of 
worker dissimilarities affect performance differently?  Furthermore, do the relationships between 
dissimilarity and performance evolve over time the longer workers interact? 
Heterogeneities in knowledge and skill possessed by workers can facilitate division of 
labor and mutual learning within organizational units.  We often hear in the popular press and 
among corporate leaders that workforce demographic diversity is profit enhancing, but the basis 
for this claim is not always made clear.
1
  It is quite possible that increased communication costs 
between demographically dissimilar workers outweigh the benefits from demographic diversity.  
Lazear (1999) models heterogeneity within work-groups and argues that in order to be 
productivity enhancing, teams should be diverse along the dimensions of skill, ability and 
information relevant to work tasks but homogeneous in other dimensions such as demographics 
                                                 
1
  See Kochan, et. al. (2003) for some views expressed by CEOs and senior managers about the merits of a 
demographically diverse workforce, including more creative problem-solving abilities and better communication 
with a diverse customer base. 
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that reduce the costs of “cross-cultural dealing”.  Becker‟s (1957) model of co-worker 
discrimination suggests that demographic differences among workers may create communication 
frictions if workers are prejudiced.  Lazear (1989) builds a theoretical model in which wage 
differences improve productivity as long as their motivating effect upon workers is greater than 
their effect of creating competitive disharmony. 
I investigate the performance consequences of nine different kinds of dissimilarity among 
employees working together within the same division.  The first three capture demographic 
heterogeneity, namely differences in age, gender and race among employees working together 
within organizational divisions.  The remaining six are non-demographic dissimilarity concepts, 
capturing differences in education level, functional area of work, firm tenure, division tenure, 
performance and wages among employees working in the same division.  I provide new insights 
into research in this area.  For example, this is the first study to empirically examine the effects 
of work-group diversity in wages and performance.  Another novel feature of the analysis is that 
I distinguish between differences among work-group members in firm tenure and division 
tenure, permitting an examination of the relative importance of firm-specific knowledge 
spillovers versus job-specific knowledge spillovers among co-workers.  
A unique advantage of my data that sets it apart from previous data which have been used 
in analyses of the effects of work-group diversity is the presence of an unusually rich level of 
detail about worker characteristics, allowing me to not only explore the effects of a wide range of 
worker dissimilarities and the synergies among them, but also to control for many other worker 
characteristics when estimating the relationship between dissimilarity and performance 
outcomes.  In particular, the rich variation in worker functional areas, spanning R&D and 
business to manufacturing and sales, lends itself most appropriately to test whether knowledge 
 4 
spillovers and skill complementarities among division members possessing different information 
sets give rise to improved performance outcomes. 
1 Theoretical Framework 
The nine types of within-division dissimilarity I examine are likely to influence 
performance outcomes through different mechanisms.  This section lays out the alternative 
hypotheses concerning these processes. 
The theoretical model of worker heterogeneity in Lazear (1999) provides a useful 
framework for thinking about the channels through which different kinds of dissimilarity may 
affect performance.  In Lazear‟s model, in order to be productivity enhancing, work-groups 
should be diverse along the dimensions of skill and information relevant to work tasks but 
homogeneous in cultural characteristics.  The gains from worker differences are greatest when 
workers have “information sets that are disjoint, that are relevant to one another, and that can be 
learned by the other [members of the group] at a low cost.”  (pp. C16).  However, in order for 
knowledge sharing to be possible, communication is necessary and work-groups that are 
homogenous along cultural dimensions minimize communication costs.  Lazear‟s concept of 
cultural differences corresponds to the demographic heterogeneity concepts in my analysis, 
namely age, gender and race dissimilarity, and his concept of knowledge differences corresponds 
to my education, function, firm tenure, division tenure and performance dissimilarity measures. 
Communication Costs 
Dissimilarity in demographic characteristics among employees working together in a 
division is likely to increase the cost of cross-cultural interaction and to make communication 
and collaboration among workers more difficult.  For example, a twenty-three year old black 
employee may be more reluctant to share his ideas and concerns about a project with an Asian 
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fifty year old than with a co-worker who belongs to the same race and age-range.  Demographic 
differences may also weaken the impact of peer pressure in motivating hard work among work-
group members (Kandel and Lazear, 1992).
2
  The frictions that arise from dealing with co-
workers of a different race, age or gender may also be due to co-worker discrimination if 
workers are prejudiced (Becker, 1957).
3
  The decreased collaboration due to demographic 
differences can lead to lower worker performance.   
Furthermore, certain kinds of demographic heterogeneity might make collaboration more 
difficult than others.  For example, age differences may be a stronger deterrent for collaboration 
than gender differences.  Whether or not this is true is an empirical question.   
An important extension of the communication costs hypothesis involves employee 
assimilation over time and tenure at the division. Communication costs between different 
demographic groups may diminish with tenure at the division: as employees become more 
familiar with their co-workers over time, cross-cultural frictions may be less likely to impede 
collaboration.  For example, after two years of working in the same division, the twenty-three 
year old black employee may not be as reluctant to share his ideas and concerns about a project 
with the Asian fifty year old (though he may still feel more comfortable with a worker who 
belongs to the same race and age range).   
Differences in tenure at the division may also give rise to communication frictions simply 
because workers are not yet acquainted with one another.  This is also likely to hold for 
                                                 
2
  Indeed, numerous laboratory experiments in psychology and sociology have shown that demographic 
heterogeneity leads to decreased communication, higher message distortion and higher errors in communication (for 
example, Clement and Schiereck, 1973; Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen, 1993; Hoffman and Maier, 1961).  
Qualitative sociological studies have also found that workers often exhibit improved performance, retention and 
promotion outcomes when their co-workers are similar in race and gender (Granovetter, 2005, 1995, 1986). 
3
  Other papers from the economics literature that present theoretical models of communication costs created by 
culture, gender and race differences include Lang (1986) and Welch (1967). 
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differences in firm tenure, though to a lesser extent.
4
  Thus the communication costs hypothesis 
predicts that dissimilarity in tenure will lower worker performance.
5
  
Socializing 
While demographic homogeneity among co-workers lowers communication costs, it may 
also give rise to a situation in which workers who have much in common spend more time 
socializing during work hours than engaging in productive work.  This can lead to decreased 
performance (see Hamermesh, 1990 for evidence that time spent at the workplace loafing lowers 
worker and firm productivity). 
Knowledge Spillovers and Skill Complementarities 
Lazear‟s (1999) theory suggests that when employees who work together are diverse 
along the dimensions of function, education, tenure, and job performance, the firm can benefit 
from knowledge spillovers and skill complementarities among the employees as long as workers‟ 
information sets are relevant to one another.  In the firm I study, a division is often comprised of 
workers involved in different and complementary functional areas.  For example, there are 
divisions combining employees in finance, legal affairs, administrative work and R&D.  The 
presence of such functional heterogeneity within divisions suggests that the interaction between 
workers possessing different and complementary information and skills is important to the firm.
6
 
Performance heterogeneity may also give rise to information sharing.  For example, high-
performers can impart performance-improving knowledge and techniques to the low-performers, 
allowing the low-performers to excel.  Moreover, the existence of low-performers will improve 
                                                 
4
  It has also been noted that workers who entered the firm or division around the same time demonstrate higher 
levels of interaction, communication, and cohesion (Pfeffer 1983, Moreland 1985, Tsui, Egan and O‟Reilly 1992).   
5
  Note that this hypothesis is distinct from the argument that the effect of heterogeneity in tenure at the division 
declines with tenure at the division, which is also likely to be true since communication frictions should diminish 
with tenure at the division.  ` 
6
  An important caveat, however, is that coordinating workers performing different and complementary tasks and 
integrating this diverse knowledge imposes costs on the firm and the workers (Becker and Murphy, 1992), and in 
certain settings organizing workers by specialized skills might be more productive. 
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the productivity of high-performers if the high-performers can allocate supplemental tasks to the 
low-performers in order to better focus their attention on tasks in which they perform well.   
A similar dynamic can arise between workers who have attained high levels of education 
and those with low educational attainment.  For example, a worker whose highest level of 
educational attainment is a bachelor‟s degree can glean valuable knowledge from a co-worker 
who holds a graduate degree such as an MBA or MD.  Similarly, the worker with the lower level 
of education may be knowledgeable about skills that complement the highly-educated worker. 
Tenure dissimilarity, both in terms of differences in firm tenure and differences in 
division tenure, is also likely to improve performance outcomes if there is considerable 
knowledge sharing among co-workers.  A worker who has been at the firm for a long time can 
share his firm-specific expertise with a junior worker.  The junior worker can in turn teach the 
senior worker some of the cutting edge technologies he recently learned in school or from his 
previous employer.  So the pairing is mutually beneficial to both the junior and senior workers.
7
 
An important extension to the knowledge spillover hypothesis is that the effects of 
dissimilarities that facilitate information spillovers are likely to diminish with the worker‟s 
tenure at the division.  The worker may benefit from the different knowledge and skill sets of his 
co-workers, but as time goes by and he absorbs his co-workers‟ knowledge, the marginal benefit 
of information sharing declines.  
Specialization 
 An alternative hypothesis concerning function and tenure dissimilarity that competes with 
the hypothesis about knowledge spillovers between co-workers possessing different information 
                                                 
7
  It has been noted that age and tenure are closely related and that their relationships with other variables are likely 
to be similar.  However, this is only sometimes true.  It is not uncommon that an older worker has relatively low 
organizational or divisional tenure.  Moreover, age is a more visible characteristic than tenure and is more likely to 
impact group functioning through feelings of similarity or dissimilarity among group members (Pfeffer, 1983).  It is 
thus important to conduct separate analyses of age and tenure heterogeneities, which I do in this study. 
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sets deals with gains from specialization.  In certain work settings, specialization may be more 
valuable than integrating different information sets; functional differences among co-workers 
may actually get in the way of successful completion of projects.  After all, the firm I study 
contains many divisions comprised of workers in similar functional areas, suggesting that 
interaction among workers with common skills is important.  Lazear‟s (1999) model discussed 
earlier focuses on learning from colleagues who have different information sets, but gives short 
shrift to another type of learning that is also likely to be quite important, namely learning about 
specialized skills from co-workers with similar skills.  Working with others who engage in 
similar lines of work and who possess similar skill sets can facilitate learning of narrow tasks and 
allow employees to perfect their specialized skills.  This is likely to be true for similarities in 
work function and education in particular.  Thus, the specialization hypothesis suggests that 
differences in function and education among co-workers may lead to lower performance.   
In essence, we can distinguish between two types of worker learning.  The first is 
learning how to perform and perfect a given set of narrow tasks well, or what we may call 
“specialized learning”.  The second is learning from different perspectives and knowledge bases, 
or what may be called “integrative learning”.  The former is likely to lead to more efficient 
production, while the latter is likely to be more useful for improving innovation or solving 
quality problems.  Whether specialized learning or integrative learning is more important in a 
given work setting is likely to depend on the type of work employees are involved in.  For 
instance, R&D is an area where integrating different ideas and perspectives is important.  
Functional areas like finance and operations and distributions likely require more specialization.  
Marketing and manufacturing may be somewhere in between.  Thus whether function and 
education heterogeneity leads to higher or lower performance will vary across different 
 9 
functional areas of work depending on the relative importance of specialization versus 
integration of knowledge.   
 Furthermore, the benefits of specialized versus integrative learning are likely to be 
different in small versus large groups of workers.  For example, it may be that small groups are 
more conducive to learning from co-workers possessing different information sets and 
integrating that diverse knowledge to facilitate innovation and quality improvement than large 
groups; on the other hand, skill dissimilarity may impede the successful completion of projects 
more markedly in small groups than in large groups. 
Productive and Counterproductive Competition 
Wage differences among co-workers within a division can produce an environment of 
productive competition by motivating workers, but it can also produce unproductive, or even 
counterproductive, competition among workers.
8
  Lazear (1989) builds a theoretical model in 
which wage diversity has two opposing effects on worker productivity.  On the one hand, the 
prospect of achieving wages at the high-end of the wage distribution motivates workers; the 
presence of high-wage employees induces the low-wage employees to work hard with the hopes 
of achieving higher wages, and the presence of low-wage employees discourages the high-wage 
workers from slacking off.  On the other hand, wage diversity leads to unproductive competition 
among workers in the form of disharmony, uncooperative behavior, or even sabotage.
9
  Whether 
wage diversity ultimately improves or lowers workers‟ productivities depends on which of the 
two opposing effects dominates.  
                                                 
8
  This argument is similar to ones made in the promotion tournaments literature regarding the incentive effects of 
the wage spread associated with winning the tournament competition (Lazear and Rosen 1981).  
9
  The wage heterogeneity Lazear (1989) has in mind is one resulting from promotion competitions, where the 
winners get the high wages.  It is not possible to determine in my dataset which workers compete with a given 
worker for promotion. My analysis concerns wage differences among people who work together in the same 
division. These workers may or may not be competing against one another for a promotion.  However, even at lower 
levels, workers are cognizant of their co-workers‟ wages and performance, which may create the desire to 
outperform their colleagues to gain better wages, better performance evaluations, and higher status in the division. 
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An argument similar to the one made for wage dissimilarity can also be made for the 
consequences of performance dissimilarity within divisions.  Differences in performance can 
create productive competition by motivating workers:  observing the high performers may 
motivate the low performers to work hard in hopes of gaining respect and approval from their 
supervisors and co-workers, promotions, and higher wages, while observing the low performers 
may keep high performers “on their toes” to preserve their superior relative status.  On the other 
hand, performance differences may create unproductive competition among workers in the form 
of disharmony, uncooperative behavior, and sabotage. 
2 Previous Empirical Research 
Relatively few empirical studies by economists investigate the effects of within-work-
group differences on outcomes.  Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2004) use data from a garment 
manufacturing plant in California and show that race differences within teams increase worker 
turnover, age and race differences lower team productivity, and diversity in the productivity of 
team members enhances team productivity, where productivity is measured by the quantity of 
garments sewn per day.  Kato and Shu (2008) use data from a textile weaving company in China 
and find that differences in productivity within teams improves the productivity of low-ability 
workers, with productivity measured as the percentage of non-defective fabrics produced per 
week.  Leonard and Levine (2006) examine the effect of heterogeneity in gender, race and age on 
turnover among sales workers in store branches of a U.S. retail chain.  They find that a worker is 
more likely to quit the greater the percentage of workers in his branch belonging to a different 
race and gender group (for men) and less likely to quit the greater the percentage of workers in 
his branch from a different age group.
10
 
                                                 
10
  There are also a number of field and experimental studies from the management, sociology, and psychology 
literatures examining the effects of various dimensions of demographic and non-demographic diversity on outcomes 
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The preceding studies examine workers involved in very narrow sets of tasks, namely 
sewing garments, weaving textiles, and retail.  An advantage of the data I use is that they provide 
rich variation in worker functional areas of work, spanning R&D and business to manufacturing 
and sales.  The variation in worker function within divisions lends itself most appropriately to 
test whether knowledge spillovers and skill complementarities among division members 
possessing different information sets give rise to improved performance outcomes, as suggested 
by Lazear (1999).  A further advantage of my data is that they contain an unusual level of detail 
about worker characteristics, allowing me to explore the effects of a much wider range of 
heterogeneity concepts--some of which have never been investigated previously--and to control 
for many worker characteristics when estimating the relationship between dissimilarity and 
performance outcomes.   
3 Data and Variables 
3.1 Overview of the Dataset 
The empirical analysis is based on the detailed personnel records of a large U.S. firm in 
the health services industry from 1989-1994.  The firm, whose identity must be kept confidential, 
is based in the Midwest but has employees all across the United States, Canada and Puerto Rico, 
as well as a small number of employees in Mexico, Europe and Asia.  The firm is vertically 
integrated as a result of several mergers with and acquisitions of corporations in related 
businesses during the past twenty years and has divisions in a range of businesses that span 
health care, finance, research and development, manufacturing, sales, legal affairs, operations 
and distributions, and marketing.  Gibbs and Hendricks (2004), who were the first to study these 
                                                                                                                                                             
ranging from psychological attachment of group members to the firm and cohesion among group members to 
innovativeness of group output, many of which are reviewed in Williams and O‟Reilly (1998) and Jackson, Joshi 
and Erhardt (2003).  Many of these studies, however, are based on small samples of workers in narrow occupational 
fields that often lack a longitudinal component.  Finally, to my knowledge there is no prior study that has examined 
the consequences of work-group heterogeneity in performance and wages.   
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data, compare the firm‟s sales, number of employees, assets, market value, CEO compensation, 
salary structure and yearly salary increases with that of other firms in the same industry using 
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the ExecuComp database, and find that the 
firm is typical along those dimensions among large-scale firms in the same industry. 
The dataset contains detailed information on workers‟ demographic and skill 
characteristics including age, gender, race, educational attainment, marital status, disability 
status, geographic location, tenure within the firm, tenure within the firm division, and detailed 
job title.  The data also include the worker‟s functional area from among the following 
categories: Executive Management, Business Affairs, Administrative, Human Resources, 
Financial Development, Finance, Regulatory Quality Assurance, Legal, Government Affairs, 
Public Affairs, Marketing, Operations/Distributions, Manufacturing, Sales Representatives, Sales 
Management, Research and Development, Electronic Data Processing, Health Care, Product 
Services, Intern, Customer Operations, and Scientific Affairs.    
The data indicate each employee‟s organizational unit, which is a grouping on the firm‟s 
organizational chart of workers in the firm‟s various businesses, such as the development of a 
specific device, its manufacture, or its customer support dimension.  While most organizational 
units are confined to a single geographic location, such as a given building in a certain city, 
many units are comprised of employees located in different cities or even states.  For example, 
one particular organizational unit broadly involved in distributions and marketing of a particular 
device developed and manufactured by the firm has employees in four different facilities in 
Illinois, Florida, Northern California and Southern California.  I define a division as the group of 
workers who are in the same organizational unit and who have the same building identifier.  My 
goal is to analyze the characteristics of people who work together, and this definition of a 
 13 
division captures that concept by eliminating situations where workers in the same unit work at 
different geographic locations.
11
  It is important to note that despite the fact that some divisions 
are quite large, most workers in a division do complementary things.  For instance, one division 
has job titles that include “Distributors”, “Secretaries”, and “Sales Representatives”.  There is 
considerable worker mobility over time across divisions, with the typical worker spending about 
1.5 years in a given division.    
The structure of the original dataset is such that on each date that a worker experiences a 
change in record, for example a pay raise or change in job, he gets a new listing reporting that 
change.  Most workers are observed over multiple years and have multiple observations per year.  
The original dataset contains 167,960 worker-incident observations during the years 1989 
through 1996.  I drop observations in 1995 and 1996 and workers in the following job functions 
due to small cell counts: Government Affairs, Public Affairs, Product Services, Internships, and 
Customer Operations.  For my empirical analysis, I restructure the data into a panel of yearly 
snapshots of each employee at the time the employee received a performance evaluation.
12
  This 
re-organization involves two steps.  Step 1: I want to associate performance ratings with the job, 
wages, and hours for which they were earned.  I therefore fill in variables for each month in 
between worker-incident observations to synchronize variable values by month.  For example, 
when a worker‟s wage rate is listed on a particular date, I fill in this wage rate forwards in time 
for each month until I hit a new wage rate, or the worker exits the firm, or the sampling window 
ends.  Then, without overwriting the aforementioned forward filling of wage rates, I fill in the 
                                                 
11
  It is of course possible that two people may be members of the same division and never have the need to work 
together.  Unfortunately, it is not possible for me to determine the prevalence of this using these data.  However, it is 
reasonable to assume that most people in the same division may benefit from collaboration on work tasks, skill 
complementarities, or cross-pollination of ideas.  It is also reasonable to expect that most people in the same division 
are cognizant of one another‟s demographic and non-demographic characteristics, which is likely to influence the 
extent of their collaboration. 
12
  A performance evaluation was usually accorded no more than once per year and could be given at all times 
throughout the year (i.e., not always around year-end). 
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worker‟s wage rate backwards in time until the worker is hired to the firm or the worker first 
enters the sample.  I take the same approach of filling in variables forwards and backwards in 
time for all the worker variables except worker performance, which requires special coding.  
When a performance rating is listed for a worker on a certain date, it is usually concurrent with a 
promotion, transfer, or merit raise, and the value of the evaluation pertains to performance prior 
to the evaluation date and after the previous evaluation date.  I therefore fill lead performance 
rating backwards in time for each month until I hit another performance rating, or the worker‟s 
hire date, or the worker‟s entry into the sample; then, without overwriting the aforementioned 
backward filling of performance ratings, I fill in the worker‟s performance rating forwards in 
time until the worker exits the firm or the sampling window ends.  Step 2: I select as the worker‟s 
yearly snapshot for the worker-year panel the month immediately prior to the month in which the 
worker‟s performance evaluation occurred.  In the few number of cases where the worker was 
evaluated more than once in a given year, I keep the first one for the yearly panel.   
Since the goal of the paper is to investigate the impact of differences among employees 
working together within the same division, divisions in which the number of workers does not 
exceed one are excluded.
13
  The final analysis sample consists of 18,413 worker-year 
observations on 9,248 workers across 702 divisions during the years 1989-1994. 
3.2 Variable Definitions 
The key outcome variable in my empirical analyses is constructed from absolute 
performance evaluations of workers by their supervisors given on a DOGNUT scale:  
“Distinguished”, “Outstanding”, “Good”, “Needs Improvement”, “Unacceptable”, and “Too 
New to Evaluate”.  Importantly, the firm does not impose forced rating curves or other 
                                                 
13
  Regression results are not sensitive to further restricting the sample to divisions consisting of more than 2 people 
or more than 3 people.  
 15 
constraints on rating distributions to fill category quotas, making performance ratings reflective 
of workers‟ actual productivities as perceived by their supervisors.  I code the category “Too 
New to Evaluate” as missing since this category reveals nothing about worker performance, and 
consolidate the “Needs Improvement” and “Unsatisfactory” categories.14  The resulting worker 
performance variable used in all of my empirical analyses is: 
Worker Performance    = 1  “Needs Improvement” or “Unacceptable” 
                = 2  “Good” 
                 = 3  “Outstanding” 
                = 4  “Distinguished” 
and has the following distribution in the sample of 18,413 worker-year observations: 3.37% take 
on a value of 1, 52.47% take on a value of 2; 41.72% take on a value of 3, and 2.44% take on a 
value of 4.  Worker Performance is positively correlated with worker characteristics like wages, 
bonuses and tenure, confirming that Worker Performance is a sensible indication of a worker‟s 
productivity (correlation tables are available from the author).  There is considerable variation in 
performance over time for a given worker.  Even in cases where the worker remains in the same 
division over time Worker Performance displays both upward and downward movement and it 
changes with time-varying conditions faced by the worker, in particular division composition 
and how dissimilar he is from the other members of his division.  
It is important to note that there exists a debate within the economics and human resource 
management literatures on whether subjective performance ratings constitute a good proxy for 
worker productivity.  Some argue that evaluations may reflect factors other than the worker‟s 
effort, such as the worker‟s innate ability, accumulated human capital, or job match quality 
(Medoff and Abraham, 1980; Barrett, 1966).  As will be illustrated later in the paper, in my 
                                                 
14
  Supervisors were also allowed to use pluses and minuses with these categories, which I have consolidated with 
the main categories.  It is important to note that regression results are not sensitive to the way in which I have 
consolidated the categories; regressions in which the performance variable is comprised of a larger number of 
categories yield coefficient estimates that are qualitatively the same, though with slightly larger standard errors.  
 16 
empirical analyses of the effect of dissimilarity on performance I control not only for workers‟ 
time varying observable characteristics such as tenure and education levels to account for factors 
such as accumulated human capital, but I also control for unobserved worker fixed effects in 
order to account for factors like innate ability that are likely to influence worker performance 
ratings.  It may also be argued that subjective performance evaluations are subject to variability 
because different divisions may have different evaluation standards due the nature of the work 
done in that division or because different supervisors may use different criteria for awarding 
ratings.  Furthermore, subjective evaluations may be affected by favoritism, bias, and 
discrimination on the part of the supervisor conducting the evaluation (Milgrom, 1988; 
Prendergast and Topel, 1996; Gibbs, et. al., 2004, Gibbs, et. al., 2009) -- for example the low 
performance rating of a worker who is the only woman in a division of men and who is being 
evaluated by a male supervisor may be a true indicator of poor performance due to 
communication and collaboration frictions, or it may reflect gender discrimination on the part of 
her supervisor.  My empirical estimates are robust to further controlling for division fixed 
effects, suggesting that division-specific evaluation standards or supervisor-specific biases may 
not be very strong determinants of performance evaluations.
15,16
  In conclusion, despite the 
aforementioned concerns raised in the literature, I believe that within the context of my empirical 
framework, Worker Performance is a reasonable proxy for worker productivity.  
The main dependent variables in my analysis indicate how dissimilar a worker is from the 
other members of his division.  I construct worker dissimilarity indexes that capture dissimilarity 
                                                 
15
  The most direct way to determine whether a low rating for a worker who is the only woman in a division of men 
and being evaluated by a male supervisor would be to include a control for supervisor-subordinate gender difference 
in the regression of performance on within-division gender dissimilarity.  Unfortunately, this is not a strategy I can 
implement because I cannot discern supervisor gender in my data. 
16
  Controlling for both worker and division fixed effects will also account for match quality, in the sense that some 
workers may perform well because they are particularly well suited to execute the jobs they are assigned to do in 
that division.   
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as perceived by each reference worker in a division.  In particular, I define the worker gender 
dissimilarity index as the share of employees in the worker‟s division who are of the opposite 
sex.  For example, if the reference worker is male, and a quarter of all employees in that 
worker‟s division are female, then the reference worker‟s gender dissimilarity index is 0.25.  
Similarly, I define the worker race dissimilarity index as the share of employees in the worker‟s 
division who belong to a race other than the worker‟s own race among race categories {white, 
black, Asian, Hispanic, other race}; the worker education dissimilarity index as the share of 
employees in the worker‟s division who have a different level of educational attainment than the 
worker‟s own level among education groups {not attained a high school degree, high school 
degree is highest degree attained, bachelor‟s degree is highest degree attained, attained an 
advanced degree}; and the worker function dissimilarity index as the share of employees in the 
worker‟s division who are in a line of work other than the worker‟s functional area.   
The above type of index is appropriate for capturing dissimilarity in categorical variables 
but not continuous variables.  I define the worker age dissimilarity index as the absolute 
difference between the natural logarithm of the age of the reference worker and the natural 
logarithm of the average age of all other workers in the division.  This captures the percent 
difference between a worker‟s age and the average age of the other employees in his division.  
Similarly, I define worker dissimilarity in firm tenure, worker dissimilarity in division tenure, 
worker wage dissimilarity, and worker performance dissimilarity as the absolute difference 
between the natural logarithm for the reference worker and the natural logarithm of the average 
for all other workers in the division.   
Definitions of all remaining variables are provided in the Appendix.   
4 Main Empirical Results 
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Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression analyses.  
Henceforth I use the terms “worker” and “worker-year” interchangeably.  A little over fifty 
percent of workers are male and have mean age 34.39.  On average workers work 39.45 hours 
per week, earn a nominal hourly wage of $16.57, have 4.27 years of seniority at the firm and 
1.29 years of seniority within their division.  The highest degree attained is a high school degree 
for 48.9% of workers, a bachelor‟s degree for 34.4% of workers, and a graduate degree for 
14.9% of workers at the firm.  Only 1.8% of workers have not graduated from high school.  The 
racial composition of workers is 75.1% Caucasian, 8% black, 8.5% Asian, 7.9% Hispanic, and 
less than one percent „Other Race‟.  Operations and Distributions and Manufacturing are the 
most prevalent functional areas, while Business and Financial Development have the smallest 
worker concentrations.  Division size equals 38 at the 25
th
 percentile, 102 at the 50
th
 percentile, 
and 270 at the 75
th
 percentile of the distribution.   
As seen in Table 1, from an individual worker‟s perspective, age dissimilarity between 
the worker and the other employees in his division is fairly small on average: the age 
dissimilarity index is 0.21, meaning that the percent difference between the age of the reference 
worker and the average age of the other employees in his division is 21 percent.  As for gender 
and race dissimilarity, the fraction of workers in a typical worker‟s division belonging to the 
opposite sex is 0.43 and the fraction belonging to another race is 0.36.  The worker dissimilarity 
indexes for firm and division tenure, capturing the percent difference between a worker and the 
other employees in his division, are 1.41 and 0.85 on average respectively.  As mentioned before, 
most employees within the same division do related things, and not surprisingly the average 
worker function dissimilarity index is only 0.36.  On the other hand, the fraction of employees in 
a typical worker‟s division belonging to a different education group is large at 0.48.  The percent 
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difference between the wage of a typical worker and the average wages of the other employees in 
his division is 34 percent, while the percent difference between the performance rating of a 
typical worker and the average rating of the other workers in his division is 21 percent. 
I next explore the relationship between dissimilarity and performance first by estimating least 
squares regressions of worker performance on the nine worker dissimilarity indexes using the pooled 
worker-year data, and then by utilizing the data‟s panel structure and performing fixed effects analysis. 
4.1. Pooled Regressions 
Table 2 presents results from linear least squares regressions of worker performance on the 
nine worker dissimilarity indexes.  In the regression specification in Column 1 of Table 2, without 
worker controls, the coefficients on age dissimilarity, race dissimilarity, dissimilarity in firm tenure 
and performance dissimilarity are negative and highly statistically significant; on the other hand, the 
coefficients on gender dissimilarity, dissimilarity in division tenure, function dissimilarity, wage 
dissimilarity and education dissimilarity are positive and highly statistically significant.  The 
specifications in Columns 2 and 3 successively add worker controls to the regression model.  As seen 
in Column 2, the results are robust to adding controls for worker gender, age, educational attainment, 
hours per week worked, hourly wage, whether the worker is paid on an annual, monthly or hourly 
basis, whether the worker works full-time, whether the worker receives bonus pay, the worker‟s tenure 
at the firm and tenure at his division, division size, race indicators, and year indicators; the one 
exception is the coefficient on race dissimilarity which loses significance.   
It is reasonable to expect that whether a person is positively or negatively affected by how 
different he is from the other members of his division is influenced by the nature of his work.  For 
example, the productivity of an employee who works in research and development may be 
significantly higher if the ages or races of his colleagues are closer to his own because he might find it 
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easier to communicate and create new ideas with demographically similar co-workers.  On the other 
hand, this might not be the case for a worker in sales representation.  To account for the possibility that 
there exist differences by function in the relationships between worker performance and worker 
dissimilarity, I further include as controls 17 dummy variables indicating the worker‟s functional area 
of work (e.g., finance, research and development, administrative, etc.).  These results are reported in 
Column 3 of Table 1.  Interestingly, once I account for a worker‟s function, the coefficient on race 
dissimilarity goes from being statistically insignificant to being negative and significant, suggesting 
that the relationship between race dissimilarity and worker performance is different for workers in 
different functions and that these differences are masked when workers in different functions are 
pooled together.  The inclusion of function dummies also results in the coefficient on education 
dissimilarity to lose significance.
17
 
Viewing the specification in Column 3 of Table 2 with the full set of worker controls as the 
main set of results, the pooled worker analysis reveals that workers who experience greater 
dissimilarity from the other members of their divisions along the dimensions of age and race exhibit 
lower performance, lending support to the communication costs hypothesis over the socializing 
hypothesis.  Gender differences, on the other hand, do not appear to increase communication costs, 
and on the contrary such differences might curb counterproductive socializing during work-time, as 
suggested by the positive coefficient on gender dissimilarity.  From the focal worker‟s perspective, 
differences from the other employees in the division in work function improve the focal worker‟s 
performance, suggesting that the worker benefits from the different knowledge and skill sets possessed 
by his co-workers.  Furthermore, performance dissimilarity has a large effect on worker performance, 
                                                 
17
  It is important to note that the sign, significance and relative magnitudes of the coefficient estimates remain the 
same when I estimate analogous regressions using an ordered probit specification.  I focus on the linear specification 
in the paper as the coefficients are more straightforward to interpret. 
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and its negative coefficient corroborates the counterproductive competition hypothesis but casts doubt 
on the information spillover and productive competition hypotheses.  Differences from the other 
employees in the division in terms of firm tenure have a negative relationship with the focal worker‟s 
performance.  This casts doubt on the hypothesis about productivity enhancing firm-specific 
knowledge spillovers between experienced and novice workers, but rather corroborates the alternative 
hypothesis that differences in time of entry into the firm can create communication barriers among 
workers.  On the other hand, differences in tenure at the division have a positive relationship with the 
focal worker‟s performance, suggesting that spillovers in division-specific human capital among 
workers are productivity enhancing.  Finally, workers who experience greater wage dissimilarity from 
their co-workers exhibit better performance, corroborating the productive competition hypothesis.
18
 
4.2 Panel Regressions 
I exploit the panel nature of the dataset by estimating linear fixed effects regressions of the 
performance of a worker on the dissimilarity experienced by that worker and time-varying worker 
controls.  Identification of the impact of dissimilarity on performance in the panel regressions comes 
from variation in a worker‟s performance and composition of workers in his division over time.19   
An advantage of panel estimation is that it allows me to control for unobserved worker 
characteristics, such as the worker‟s inherent ability or his discriminatory preferences, that might bias 
the revealed relationships between worker dissimilarity and worker performance.  It also allows me to 
address the potential endogeneity of my dissimilarity measures.  If the unobserved determinants of 
                                                 
18
  The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates on the dissimilarity indexes should be interpreted with care.  For 
example, the coefficient of 0.056 on gender dissimilarity means that, on average, a 1 percentage point increase in the 
share of employees in a worker‟s division who are of the opposite gender leads to an increase in the worker‟s 
performance of 0.056 units ( [0.056/2. 432]*100=2.3 percent); and the coefficient of 0.066 on wage dissimilarity 
implies that, on average, a 1 percentage point increase in the percent difference between a worker‟s wage and the 
average wage of the other employees in his division leads to a 0.066 unit ([0.066/2.432]*100=2.7 percent) increase 
in the worker‟s performance. Thus the relationships are not only statistically but also economically significant. 
19
  As mentioned in Section 3, worker performance changes over time.  Moreover, workers in a division change over 
time, either due to movement between divisions or entry into or exit from the worker-year sample.     
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worker dissimilarity within divisions are correlated with the unobserved determinants of worker 
performance, least squares estimates will be biased and inconsistent.  For example, a worker may have 
self-selected himself into a particular kind of division due to his tastes, ability, discriminatory 
preferences, social networks, or other characteristics unobservable to the econometrician.  
Alternatively, he may have been assigned to a particular kind of division by the firm due to these 
characteristics.  Fixed effects analysis mitigates the econometric problems created by the potential 
endogeneity of the main explanatory variables, at least to the extent that they are determined by time-
invariant unobserved worker attributes.
20
   
Table 3 shows coefficient estimates from linear fixed effects regressions.  A number of the 
dissimilarity indexes which were found to have statistically significant relationships with worker 
performance in the linear least squares regressions in the previous sub-section are no longer 
significant, suggesting that unobserved worker characteristics are important in determining the 
relationship between dissimilarity and performance.  However, those that are significant are 
qualitatively the same as the pooled estimates.  In Column 1 of Table 3, without additional worker 
controls, the coefficients on dissimilarity in age, firm tenure, function, and performance are negative 
and statistically significant; the coefficients on the other dissimilarity indexes are not significant.  
When controls are included for worker age, gender, educational attainment, hours per week worked, 
hourly wage, whether the worker is paid on an annual, monthly or hourly basis, whether the worker 
works full-time, whether the worker receives bonus pay, the worker‟s tenure at the firm and tenure at 
                                                 
20
 It should be noted, however, that fixed effects analysis does not remedy possible biases due to a different type of 
endogeneity, namely reverse causality in the relationship between worker dissimilarity and worker performance.  For 
example, a worker might be assigned to a division in which most workers are different from him due to his performance.  
This is a potential problem which the existing literature tends to ignore, and to which my analysis is also not immune.  My 
investigation of this issue using two stage least squares analysis with lagged dissimilarity and city as instruments for the 
nine dissimilarity measures reveals that the instrumental variables estimates are in fact similar to the least squares estimates 
but have larger standard errors, suggesting that reverse causality (or time-varying unobserved worker attributes more 
generally) is not a source of bias in my estimates.   
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the division, division size, race indicators and year indictors , the coefficients on dissimilarity in firm 
tenure and performance remain statistically significant but the coefficients on age and function 
dissimilarity are no longer significant (Column 2).  Further adding controls for the worker‟s functional 
area of work (Column 3) results in the negative but statistically insignificant coefficient on age 
dissimilarity to become negative and statistically significant, and the positive but statistically 
insignificant coefficient on wage dissimilarity to become positive and significant. 
Interestingly, while the coefficients on dissimilarity in gender and race were significant in the 
main pooled regression (Column 3 of Table 2), they are no longer significant once worker fixed effects 
are accounted for in the main panel regression (Column 3 of Table 3).  This suggests that a worker‟s 
discriminatory preferences or his social tendencies, which are unobserved to the econometrician, may 
play an important role in determining how a worker is influenced by the race and gender 
characteristics of his co-workers.  Second, the coefficients on function dissimilarity and division 
tenure dissimilarity, which were positive and strongly significant in the main pooled regression are 
now no longer significant.  A possible explanation for this may be that more able workers are those 
who benefit from the different knowledge and skill sets possessed by their co-workers whereas 
function and division tenure heterogeneity have no effect on the performance of less able workers, so 
once unobserved worker ability is held constant in the fixed effects analysis, the relationships between 
worker performance and function and division tenure dissimilarity become statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
5.  Extensions 
 In the remainder of the paper, I consider extensions to the main analysis presented in Section 4. 
5.1  Does the Impact of Dissimilarity Decline with Tenure at the Division? 
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If dissimilarities such as age dissimilarity and firm tenure dissimilarity increase 
communication costs among workers in the division, one would expect these costs to become 
smaller the longer division members work together.  In other words, one would expect the 
negative effects of such heterogeneities to decline with tenure at the division.  Analogously, if 
knowledge dissimilarities such as function and division tenure dissimilarity facilitate information 
spillovers, one would expect these spillovers to diminish with tenure at the division:  division 
members may benefit from the different information and skill sets of their co-workers, but as 
time goes by and workers absorb one another‟s knowledge, the marginal benefit of information-
sharing declines.  Relatedly, if function and education similarity are conducive to perfecting 
narrow skills and enhancing specialized learning from co-workers with common skills over time, 
one would expect the negative influence of function and education dissimilarity to also diminish 
with tenure at the division.  These hypotheses can be tested by incorporating interaction terms of 
dissimilarity with tenure at the division into the baseline panel regression of performance on 
dissimilarity and the full set of worker controls.   
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates from this regression, along with the implied marginal 
effects of dissimilarity on worker performance computed at different percentiles of division tenure.
21
  
Reading across rows, we see that the negative impact of age dissimilarity diminishes the longer 
the worker is a member of the division in support of the hypothesis of declining communication 
costs.  We also see that the marginal effect of firm tenure dissimilarity is negative only when the 
worker is very new to his division, but becomes positive and grows in magnitude among workers 
with high division tenure.  This suggests that after a brief initial period of communication 
frictions workers are able to benefit from the diverse information sets of their co-workers.  
                                                 
21
  Worker tenure at the division in the analysis sample is 0.085 years at the 5
th
 percentile, 0.247 years at the 10
th
 
percentile, 0.504 years at the 25
th
 percentile, 1 year at the 50
th
 percentile, 1.918 years at the 75
th
 percentile, 2.753 
years at the 90
th
 percentile, 3.170 years at the 95
th
 percentile. 
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Furthermore, the negative effect of performance dissimilarity is largest when the worker is new 
to his division and diminishes over time, suggesting that workers gradually learn how to avoid 
being adversely affected by differences in the performance levels of their co-workers. Also, 
function dissimilarity has a negative effect only when the worker is new to his division, 
suggesting that low-functional commonality with co-workers impedes learning how to perform 
specialized tasks primarily during the worker‟s initial period with his colleagues.  Lastly, the 
positive marginal effect of wage dissimilarity diminishes with division tenure suggesting that the 
motivation workers derive from wage inequality erodes over time.
22
 
5.2  Regressions by Functional Area of Work 
 The evidence in Section 4 suggests that workers involved in different lines of work may be 
affected differently by dissimilarity.  I further explore this idea by estimating separate panel 
regressions of worker performance on the nine dissimilarity indexes and full set of worker controls for 
workers in selected functional areas.  These estimates are displayed in Table 5.  In Column 1 the 
sample pertains to workers whose functional area of work is finance, while the samples of Columns 2 
through 6 pertain to workers whose functional areas of work are marketing, operations and 
distributions, manufacturing, sales representation, and R&D.   
Although many of the estimates have low explanatory power due to the small sample sizes, it is 
evident that the impact of worker dissimilarity on worker performance is quite different for workers in 
different occupations.  For example, for workers in operations and distributions, race dissimilarity has 
a negative impact on performance.  On the other hand, the relationship between race dissimilarity and 
performance is positive, though not statistically significant, for workers in sales representation.  One 
can offer many possible explanations for why this might be the case.  Perhaps workers in operations 
and distributions experience disutility from working alongside people of different races, while sales 
                                                 
22
  Note that these results are robust to holding the average worker tenure in the division constant. 
 26 
workers enjoy cross-cultural dealing.  Another possibility is that sales representatives often have 
strong communication skills, thus making communication costs low for workers in this area.  Yet 
another potential explanation is that sales workers deal mainly with customers rather than with one 
other, so that there is less reason to expect demographic differences from their co-workers to affect 
their performance.  We also see in Table 5, though again with low statistical significance, that the 
effect of function dissimilarity is positive for workers in R&D and marketing, but negative for workers 
in finance, manufacturing, operations and distributions, and sales representation, suggesting that 
specialized learning is more important than integrative learning for the successful completion of tasks 
in the latter lines of work than in the former. 
 5.3  Do the Effects of Dissimilarity Vary with Division Size? 
 To explore whether the impact of dissimilarity varies with the number of employees in the 
focal worker‟s division, I incorporate interaction terms of dissimilarity with division size into the 
baseline fixed effects regression of performance on dissimilarity and the full set of worker controls.  
Table 6 reports coefficient estimates, along with the implied marginal effects of dissimilarity on 
worker performance computed at different percentiles of division size.
23
  Reading across rows, we see 
that the negative impact of age dissimilarity diminishes as a division gets larger, suggesting that the 
adverse effect of communication frictions between old and young workers manifests itself more in 
smaller divisions.  The negative effect of race dissimilarity, on the other hand, is magnified in large 
divisions, perhaps because larger divisions are more conducive to the formation of within-division 
race clusters reinforcing racial isolation.  The impact of tenure dissimilarity is generally invariant to 
division size: the coefficient on dissimilarity in firm tenure is small and does not change much with 
division size, while the coefficient on dissimilarity in division tenure is never statistically significant.  
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  Division size in the analysis sample is 7 workers at the 5
th
 percentile, 13 workers at the 10
th
 percentile, 38 
workers at the 25
th
 percentile, 102 workers at the 50
th
 percentile, 270 workers at the 75
th
 percentile, 445 workers at 
the 90
th
 percentile, 551 workers at the 95
th
 percentile. 
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Finally let us turn to evidence of integrative learning versus specialization among co-workers in small 
and large divisions.  The negative impact of function dissimilarity is exacerbated in small divisions.  
This suggests that knowledge and skill differences impede productivity to a greater extent making 
specialization more valuable in smaller divisions.  A possible explanation is that larger divisions offer 
a more flexible work environment in which some can specialize while others can synthesize diverse 
information.  The negative effect of performance dissimilarity is also larger in small divisions, 
suggesting that performance differences get in the way of successful completion of projects to a 
greater extent in smaller divisions. 
5.4  Robustness Analysis 
 One might argue that even after having accounted for worker fixed effects and time-varying 
worker controls, there may remain unobserved division characteristics like division-specific evaluation 
standards, managerial ability, or division culture, that might affect the revealed relationships between 
worker performance and dissimilarity.  As a robustness check I therefore also included division fixed 
effects in the baseline worker fixed effects models discussed in Section 4.2 and Table 3.
24
  In addition 
to allowing me to control for unobserved division attributes, this also mitigates possible bias due to the 
potential endogeneity of my worker dissimilarity measures if, for example, the worker was placed in a 
particular division based on that division‟s importance relative to others or the extent of its interaction 
with the customer base or some other division characteristics unobservable to the econometrician. 
Panel estimates with both worker and division fixed effects are presented in Table 7 and reveal 
that the main results found in Table 3 are robust even after controlling for division fixed effects.  In 
particular, comparing the most controlled specifications in the last columns of Tables 3 and 7, we see 
that the estimates are qualitatively similar in sign and significance; furthermore accounting for division 
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  Note that identification of the effect of worker dissimilarity on worker performance comes from variation in 
worker performance and division composition for a given worker in a given division over time, and we are able to 
distinguish the worker fixed effect from the division fixed effect due to the fact that workers move across divisions. 
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fixed effects results in the coefficients on age and wage dissimilarity to become sharper and larger in 
magnitude, suggesting that unobserved factors such as managerial ability and division norms play a 
role in the extent to which workers are influenced by the age and wage attributes of their co-workers. 
6 Conclusions  
The topic of firms‟ decisions on how to organize workers and the consequences of these 
decisions on employee and employer outcomes is an exciting area of research that has not yet 
been sufficiently explored.  My paper explores a distinct aspect of this topic, namely, what 
happens when employees working together in the same division are different from one another.  I 
simultaneously examine the effects of nine different types of dissimilarity on worker 
performance, permitting elucidation of synergies among the various dimensions of dissimilarity, 
an important feature lacking from previous diversity studies using datasets more limited in 
worker characteristics.    
 I would like to highlight some principal findings that emerge from the analysis.  First, 
age dissimilarity is associated with lower worker performance, corroborating the hypothesis that 
certain demographic dissimilarities among employees working together in the same division 
increase the costs of cross-cultural dealing and make communication and collaboration between 
workers more difficult, while casting doubt on the socializing hypothesis.  Gender and race 
dissimilarities, on the other hand, do not appear to create collaboration barriers or curb 
unproductive socializing during work hours. 
Second, differences from the other employees in the division in terms of firm tenure is 
associated with lower focal worker performance, casting doubt on the hypothesis about 
productivity enhancing knowledge spillovers between experienced and novice workers, while 
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supporting the hypothesis that differences in time of entry into the firm may create 
communication barriers among workers. 
Third, the hypothesis that wage differences motivate co-workers through productive 
competition receives support as indicated by the positive relationship between wage 
heterogeneity and worker performance. 
Fourth, performance dissimilarity is associated with lower worker performance, 
corroborating the hypothesis that differences in performance create disharmony or 
counterproductive competition among division members while casting doubt on the hypothesis 
about knowledge spillovers between high performers and low performers.   
In addition to the main findings above, my analysis also reveals that the effects of certain 
types of dissimilarities get smaller in magnitude the longer a worker is part of a division, 
suggesting that communication costs among workers diminish with division tenure as members 
get to know one another and that the marginal value of information sharing declines as workers 
absorb one another‟s knowledge over time.  Finally, the paper presents evidence that the 
relationship between performance and the various measures of dissimilarity vary by the 
functional area the worker is involved in and division size. 
These findings have important implications in terms of firm policies on how to organize 
workers.  Although the analysis in this paper is based on workers comprising a single U.S. firm, 
this firm is very large and is typical in terms of assets, sales and compensation structure among 
large-scale U.S. firms in the same industry, therefore the results in this study can be generalized 
to U.S. firms more broadly. 
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 Tables 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Observations 
Worker Controls 
  Worker Male 0.503 0.500 17,982 
Worker Age 34.388 8.859 17,982 
Worker No High School Degree 0.018 0.134 16,407 
Worker High School Degree 0.489 0.500 16,407 
Worker Bachelor‟s Degree 0.344 0.475 16,407 
Worker Advanced Degree 0.149 0.356 16,407 
Worker Full Time 0.980 0.139 18,413 
Worker Hours 39.454 2.778 18,413 
Worker Paid Annually 0.462 0.499 18,412 
Worker Paid Monthly 0.331 0.471 18,412 
Worker Paid Hourly 0.207 0.405 18,412 
Worker Wage 16.574 9.838 18,411 
Worker Bonus 0.078 0.269 18,364 
Worker Caucasian 0.751 0.432 17,982 
Worker Black 0.080 0.272 17,982 
Worker Asian 0.085 0.278 17,982 
Worker Hispanic 0.079 0.270 17,982 
Worker Other Race 0.005 0.069 17,982 
Worker Tenure at Firm 4.269 5.205 18,413 
Worker Tenure at Division 1.290 0.973 16,267 
Worker Division Size 200.458 285.416 16,267 
Year89 0.024 0.154 18,413 
Year90 0.142 0.349 18,413 
Year91 0.235 0.424 18,413 
Year92 0.246 0.431 18,413 
Year93 0.288 0.453 18,413 
Year94 0.065 0.247 18,413 
Worker Executive Management 0.003 0.055 18,408 
Worker Business 0.003 0.052 18,408 
Worker Administrative 0.015 0.120 18,408 
Worker Human Resources 0.028 0.166 18,408 
Worker Financial Development 0.003 0.053 18,408 
Worker Finance 0.098 0.297 18,408 
Worker Quality Assurance 0.080 0.271 18,408 
Worker Legal 0.007 0.084 18,408 
Worker Marketing 0.065 0.247 18,408 
Worker Operations Distributions 0.237 0.425 18,408 
Worker Manufacturing 0.197 0.398 18,408 
Worker Sales Representation 0.083 0.276 18,408 
Worker Sales Management 0.021 0.142 18,408 
Worker Research and Development 0.097 0.296 18,408 
Worker Electronic Data Processing 0.048 0.214 18,408 
Worker Health Care 0.012 0.107 18,408 
Worker Scientific Affairs 0.003 0.058 18,408 
Worker Dissimilarity Indexes 
 Worker Age Dissimilarity 0.211 0.144 16,073 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.430 0.178 16,116 
Worker Race Dissimilarity 0.357 0.301 16,116 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure 1.414 1.532 16,267 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure 0.846 1.915 16,267 
Worker Function Dissimilarity 0.358 0.357 16,267 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.340 0.276 16,103 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity 0.211 0.155 16,036 
Worker Education Dissimilarity 0.478 0.266 14,803 
Worker Outcome Variable 
  Worker Performance 2.432 0.601 18,413 
Note: The sample contains 18,413 worker-year observations on 9,248 workers in 702 divisions.    
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Table 2:  Relationship Between Dissimilarity and Worker Performance:   
        Pooled Least Squares Regressions 
 Dependent Variable:  Worker Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Worker Age Dissimilarity -0.216*** -0.103** -0.127*** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.084** 0.095*** 0.056* 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity -0.124*** -0.036 -0.058* 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.034) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure -0.046*** -0.022*** -0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity 0.088*** 0.067*** 0.080*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.162*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity -0.690*** -0.691*** -0.672*** 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.049) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity 0.097*** 0.086*** 0.019 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) 
Worker Male  -0.048*** -0.042*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
Worker Age  -0.002*** -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Worker Full Time  -0.100 -0.087 
  (0.077) (0.078) 
Worker Hours  0.010** 0.009** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Worker Paid Annually  -0.215*** -0.211*** 
  (0.025) (0.027) 
Worker Paid Monthly  -0.085*** -0.077*** 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
Worker Wage  0.015*** 0.013*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Worker Bonus  -0.130*** -0.111*** 
  (0.028) (0.029) 
Worker Tenure at Firm  0.007*** 0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Worker Tenure at Division  0.036*** 0.033*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Worker Division Size  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Worker Education Dummies NO YES YES 
Worker Race Dummies NO YES YES 
Worker Year Dummies NO YES YES 
Worker Function Dummies NO NO YES 
Constant 2.532*** 2.159*** 2.236*** 
 (0.022) (0.098) (0.101) 
Observations 14581 14581 14581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.068 0.108 0.127 
Note:  Based on the pooled worker-year sample.  Robust standard errors clustered by worker are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   The omitted category for the frequency of payment dummy variable group is Worker Paid Hourly.    
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Table 3:  Relationship Between Dissimilarity and Worker Performance:   
       Panel Regressions with Worker Fixed Effects 
 Dependent Variable:  Worker Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Worker Age Dissimilarity -0.283** -0.198 -0.213* 
 (0.127) (0.128) (0.129) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.067 0.065 0.064 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity -0.112 -0.130 -0.129 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure -0.038*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure 0.006 0.005 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity -0.072* -0.060 -0.055 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.043) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.025 0.068 0.075* 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity -0.370*** -0.388*** -0.387*** 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity -0.016 0.024 0.009 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) 
Worker Male      
    
Worker Age  0.035* 0.035* 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
Worker Full Time  -0.087 -0.086 
  (0.087) (0.087) 
Worker Hours  0.009** 0.009* 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Worker Paid Annually  -0.263*** -0.261*** 
  (0.082) (0.083) 
Worker Paid Monthly  -0.100* -0.105* 
  (0.055) (0.056) 
Worker Wage  -0.017*** -0.018*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Worker Bonus  0.044 0.029 
  (0.046) (0.047) 
Worker Tenure at Firm  0.017 0.019 
  (0.024) (0.024) 
Worker Tenure at Division  0.017 0.016 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
Worker Division Size  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Worker Education Dummies       
Worker Race Dummies       
Year Dummies NO YES YES 
Worker Function Dummies NO NO YES 
Constant 2.636*** 1.525** 1.552** 
 (0.057) (0.661) (0.662) 
Observations 14581 14581 14581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.035 0.037 
Number of id 8059 8059 8059 
Note:  Based on the worker-year sample.  Robust standard errors clustered by worker are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   The omitted category for the frequency of payment dummy variable group is Worker Paid Hourly.      
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Table 4: How the Relationship Between Dissimilarity and Worker Performance Varies 
with Tenure at the Division  
 
Panel A:  Panel Regression with Interactions and Worker Fixed Effects 
 
 Dependent Variable: Worker Performance 
Worker Age Dissimilarity -0.290** 
 (0.135) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.081 
 (0.075) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity -0.116 
 (0.097) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure -0.019*** 
 (0.006) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure 0.007* 
 (0.004) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity -0.086* 
 (0.048) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.125** 
 (0.053) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity -0.452*** 
 (0.094) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity 0.064 
 (0.073) 
Worker Age Dissimilarity * Worker Tenure at Division 0.049 
 (0.045) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity * Worker Tenure at Division -0.017 
 (0.034) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity * Worker Tenure at Division -0.003 
 (0.020) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Tenure at Firm * Worker Tenure at Division 0.044*** 
 (0.013) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Tenure at Division * Worker Tenure at Division -0.012 
 (0.014) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity * Worker Tenure at Division 0.019 
 (0.017) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity * Worker Tenure at Division -0.037* 
 (0.022) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity * Worker Tenure at Division 0.049 
 (0.060) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity * Worker Tenure at Division -0.048** 
 (0.024) 
Worker Male   
  
Worker Age 0.034* 
 (0.021) 
Worker Full Time -0.075 
 (0.087) 
Worker Hours 0.009* 
 (0.004) 
Worker Paid Annually -0.275*** 
 (0.083) 
Worker Paid Monthly -0.120** 
 (0.056) 
Worker Wage -0.016*** 
 (0.004) 
Worker Bonus 0.037 
 (0.047) 
Worker Tenure at Firm 0.026 
 (0.024) 
Worker Tenure at Division 0.010 
 (0.028) 
Worker Division Size -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Worker Education Dummies   
Worker Race Dummies   
Year Dummies YES 
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Worker Function Dummies YES 
Constant 1.480** 
 (0.665) 
Observations 14581 
Number of id 8059 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041 
Note:  Based on the worker-year sample.  Robust standard errors clustered by worker are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   The omitted category for the frequency of payment dummy variable group is Worker Paid Hourly.     
 
Panel B:  Implied Marginal Effects of Dissimilarity on Worker Performance at Selected 
Percentiles of Worker Tenure at the Division 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Worker Performance 
 Percentile of Worker Tenure at the Division: 
 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 
Worker Age Dissimilarity -0.286** -0.278** -0.265** -0.241* -0.196 -0.155 -0.134 
 (0.134) (0.132) (0.130) (0.130) (0.138) (0.156) (0.167) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.079 0.077 0.072 0.064 0.048 0.034 0.026 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.068) (0.065) (0.070) (0.086) (0.096) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity -0.116 -0.117 -0.118 -0.119 -0.122 -0.125 -0.126 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.100) (0.103) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure -0.015** -0.008 0.003 0.024* 0.064** 0.101*** 0.119*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.025) (0.036) (0.041) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure 0.005 0.004 0.000 -0.006 -0.017 -0.027 -0.032 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014) (0.027) (0.038) (0.044) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity -0.084* -0.081* -0.076* -0.067 -0.050 -0.034 -0.027 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.051) (0.054) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.122** 0.116** 0.107** 0.088* 0.054 0.023 0.007 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.057) (0.062) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity -0.448*** -0.440*** -0.427*** -0.403*** -0.357*** -0.316*** -0.295** 
 (0.090) (0.084) (0.076) (0.068) (0.085) (0.122) (0.143) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity 0.060 0.052 0.040 0.016 -0.028 -0.069 -0.089 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.077) (0.082) 
Note:  Based on the worker-year sample.  Robust standard errors clustered by worker are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.    
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Table 5: Relationship Between Dissimilarity and Worker Performance:  
      Panel Regressions by Selected Worker Functional Areas 
 Dependent Variable:  Worker Performance 
 Finance 
(1) 
Marketing 
(2) 
Oper./Distr. 
(3) 
Manufac. 
(4) 
Sales Reps. 
(5) 
R&D 
(6) 
Worker Age Dissimilarity -0.307 -0.580 -0.349 -0.456 -0.372 0.784* 
 (0.500) (0.541) (0.242) (0.374) (0.389) (0.426) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.147 -0.062 -0.014 -0.115 0.101 -0.341 
 (0.236) (0.259) (0.108) (0.268) (0.196) (0.267) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity -0.409 0.345 -0.291* -0.276 0.403 0.003 
 (0.272) (0.428) (0.177) (0.269) (0.383) (0.319) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure -0.021 0.007 -0.036*** 0.007 -0.124*** -0.026** 
 (0.024) (0.055) (0.014) (0.013) (0.029) (0.013) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure -0.006 0.022** 0.013 -0.007 0.051** 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.025) (0.010) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity -0.208 0.088 -0.272** -0.123 -0.072 0.146 
 (0.150) (0.206) (0.128) (0.179) (0.237) (0.137) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.291 0.161 0.037 0.105 -0.100 -0.125 
 (0.183) (0.187) (0.114) (0.138) (0.149) (0.165) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity 0.175 0.119 -0.413*** -0.044 -0.183 -1.193*** 
 (0.254) (0.347) (0.108) (0.244) (0.236) (0.184) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity -0.265 -0.449** 0.012 0.218 0.088 -0.159 
 (0.240) (0.208) (0.134) (0.211) (0.324) (0.182) 
Worker Male             
       
Worker Age -0.084 -0.123 0.090** 0.013 0.154 0.078 
 (0.066) (0.088) (0.045) (0.047) (0.114) (0.061) 
Worker Full Time -0.519* -0.604 -0.009 0.431*** 0.000 0.132 
 (0.290) (0.461) (0.138) (0.110) (0.000) (0.193) 
Worker Hours 0.057*** 0.056 0.006 -0.012 -0.100*** -0.020 
 (0.020) (0.047) (0.006) (0.007) (0.030) (0.016) 
Worker Paid Annually -0.803*** 0.179 -0.291* -0.092 0.000 -0.468*** 
 (0.285) (0.353) (0.159) (0.221) (0.000) (0.180) 
Worker Paid Monthly -0.614** 0.187 -0.097 0.074 -0.226 -0.257*** 
 (0.261) (0.154) (0.088) (0.095) (0.173) (0.097) 
Worker Wage -0.043*** 0.020 -0.036*** -0.023 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) 
Worker Bonus -0.066 -0.068 -0.060 0.155 0.029 0.271* 
 (0.112) (0.149) (0.171) (0.114) (0.172) (0.154) 
Worker Tenure at Firm 0.140* 0.235** -0.032 0.028 -0.185 -0.069 
 (0.078) (0.117) (0.052) (0.061) (0.134) (0.068) 
Worker Tenure at Division 0.015 0.013 0.055** -0.057* 0.143** 0.014 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.024) (0.030) (0.058) (0.033) 
Worker Division Size -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Worker Education Dummies             
Worker Race Dummies             
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 4.569** 3.480 0.016 2.549 1.997 1.730 
 (2.123) (2.959) (1.339) (1.571) (3.504) (2.052) 
Observations 1497 925 3635 2895 1130 1420 
Adjusted R-squared 0.061 0.068 0.132 0.018 0.141 0.133 
Number of id 849 549 2201 1727 813 746 
Note:  Based on the worker-year sample.  Robust standard errors clustered by worker are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   The omitted category for the frequency of payment dummy variable group is Worker Paid Hourly.     
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Table 6:  How the Relationship Between Dissimilarity and Worker Performance  
   Varies with Division Size  
 
Panel A:  Panel Regression with Interactions and Worker Fixed Effects  
 
 Dependent Variable: Worker Performance 
Worker Age Dissimilarity -0.241* 
 (0.132) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.071 
 (0.072) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity -0.095 
 (0.096) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure -0.030*** 
 (0.007) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure 0.007 
 (0.004) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity -0.091** 
 (0.045) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.064 
 (0.051) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity -0.458*** 
 (0.080) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity -0.003 
 (0.068) 
Worker Age Dissimilarity * Worker Division Size 0.001 
 (0.000) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity * Worker Division Size -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity * Worker Division Size -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Tenure at Firm * Worker Division Size 0.000* 
 (0.000) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Tenure at Division * Worker Division Size -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity * Worker Division Size 0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity * Worker Division Size 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity * Worker Division Size 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity * Worker Division Size 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Worker Male   
  
Worker Age 0.036* 
 (0.021) 
Worker Full Time -0.087 
 (0.088) 
Worker Hours 0.009* 
 (0.004) 
Worker Paid Annually -0.263*** 
 (0.083) 
Worker Paid Monthly -0.107* 
 (0.057) 
Worker Wage -0.017*** 
 (0.004) 
Worker Bonus 0.028 
 (0.046) 
Worker Tenure at Firm 0.017 
 (0.024) 
Worker Tenure at Division 0.018 
 (0.011) 
Worker Division Size -0.001* 
 (0.000) 
Worker Education Dummies   
Worker Race Dummies   
Year Dummies YES 
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Worker Function Dummies YES 
Constant 1.566** 
 (0.663) 
Observations 14581 
Number of id 8059 
Adjusted R-squared 0.040 
Note:  Based on the worker-year sample.  Robust standard errors clustered by worker are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   The omitted category for the frequency of payment dummy variable group is Worker Paid Hourly.     
 
 
Panel B: Implied Marginal Effect of Dissimilarity on Worker Performance at Selected 
      Percentiles of Division Size 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Worker Performance 
 Percentile of Division Size: 
 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 
Worker Age Dissimilarity -0.236* -0.233* -0.217* -0.177 -0.073 0.036 0.101 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.129) (0.129) (0.154) (0.206) (0.244) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.065 0.055 0.046 0.040 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.066) (0.067) (0.117) (0.193) (0.242) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity -0.097 -0.099 -0.106 -0.125 -0.173* -0.223** -0.253** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.093) (0.098) (0.113) (0.125) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity -0.089** -0.087* -0.079* -0.059 -0.007 0.047 0.080 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.057) (0.065) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.046) (0.052) (0.071) (0.085) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity -0.455*** -0.452*** -0.440*** -0.410*** -0.331*** -0.248* -0.198 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.074) (0.069) (0.088) (0.136) (0.170) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.017 0.051 0.086 0.107 
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.067) (0.068) (0.080) (0.106) (0.124) 
Note:  Based on the worker-year sample.  Robust standard errors clustered by worker are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.    
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Table 7:  Relationship Between Dissimilarity and Worker Performance:  Panel Regressions 
with Worker and Division Fixed Effects 
 Dependent Variable:  Worker Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Worker Age Dissimilarity -0.596*** -0.478*** -0.476*** 
 (0.145) (0.150) (0.150) 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity 0.064 0.072 0.070 
 (0.067) (0.071) (0.070) 
Worker Race Dissimilarity -0.112 -0.134 -0.126 
 (0.169) (0.159) (0.159) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure -0.030*** -0.018** -0.018*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Worker Function Dissimilarity -0.035 -0.015 -0.006 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.065) 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity 0.059 0.121** 0.122** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
Worker Performance Dissimilarity -0.372*** -0.391*** -0.388*** 
 (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) 
Worker Education Dissimilarity -0.043 0.020 0.022 
 (0.088) (0.084) (0.085) 
Worker Male      
    
Worker Age  0.029 0.027 
  (0.018) (0.018) 
Worker Full Time  -0.091 -0.111 
  (0.094) (0.100) 
Worker Hours  0.008** 0.010** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Worker Paid Annually  -0.206** -0.204** 
  (0.080) (0.082) 
Worker Paid Monthly  -0.092* -0.093* 
  (0.053) (0.055) 
Worker Wage  -0.022*** -0.022*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Worker Bonus  0.015 0.011 
  (0.044) (0.044) 
Worker Tenure at Firm  0.021 0.023 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
Worker Tenure at Division  0.026* 0.026* 
  (0.014) (0.015) 
Worker Division Size  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Worker Education Dummies       
Worker Race Dummies       
Year Dummies NO YES YES 
Worker Function Dummies NO NO YES 
Constant 4.098*** 3.343*** 3.284*** 
 (0.119) (0.626) (0.651) 
Observations 14581 14581 14581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.094 0.109 0.109 
Number of id 8059 8059 8059 
Note:  Based on the worker-year sample.  Robust standard errors clustered by division are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   The omitted category for the frequency of payment dummy variable group is Worker Paid Hourly.     
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Appendix:  Variable Definitions 
Outcome Variable  
Worker Performance Performance evaluation rating of the worker. 
Worker Dissimilarity Indexes  
Worker Age Dissimilarity Age dissimilarity between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as | ln(age of the focal 
worker) – ln(average age of the workers in the division other than the focal worker) |. 
Worker Gender Dissimilarity Gender dissimilarity between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as the share of employees 
in the worker‟s division who are of the opposite sex. 
Worker Race Dissimilarity Race dissimilarity between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as the share of employees in 
the worker‟s division who belong to a race other than his own; the race categories are: Caucasian, Black, Asian, 
Hispanic, Other Race. 
Worker Dissimilarity in Firm Tenure Dissimilarity in firm tenure between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as | ln(firm tenure 
of the focal worker) – ln(average firm tenure of the workers in the division other than the focal worker) |. 
Worker Dissimilarity in Division Tenure Dissimilarity in division tenure between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as | ln(division 
tenure of the focal worker) – ln(average division tenure of the workers in the division other than the focal worker) | . 
Worker Function Dissimilarity Function dissimilarity between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as the share of 
employees in the worker‟s division who work in a functional area other than his own. 
Worker Wage Dissimilarity Wage dissimilarity between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as | ln(nominal hourly wage 
of the focal worker) – ln(average nominal hourly wage of the workers in the division other than the focal worker) | .  
Worker Performance Dissimilarity Performance dissimilarity between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as | ln(performance 
evaluation rating of the focal worker) – ln(average performance evaluation rating of the workers in the division other 
than the focal worker) | . 
Worker Education Dissimilarity Education dissimilarity between the worker and the other members of his division, computed as the share of 
employees in the worker‟s division who have a different level of educational attainment than his own; the education 
level categories are: Worker has not attained a high school degree, A high school degree is the worker‟s highest 
degree attained, A bachelor‟s degree is the worker‟s highest degree attained, The worker has attained an advanced 
degree. 
Control Variables  
Worker Male Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker is male, and zero otherwise. 
Worker Age Age of worker. 
Worker Hours Number of hours worked per week. 
Worker Wage Nominal hourly salary of worker. 
Worker Paid Hourly Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker receives hourly pay, and 0 otherwise. 
Worker Paid Annually Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker receives annual pay, and 0 otherwise. 
Worker Paid Monthly Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker receives monthly pay, and 0 otherwise. 
Worker Full Time Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker works full-time, and 0 otherwise. 
Worker Bonus Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker receives a performance bonus, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Tenure at Firm Worker tenure at the firm (in years). 
Worker Tenure at Division Worker tenure at the division, i.e., time since worker joined the division (in years). 
Worker Caucasian Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker is Caucasian, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Black Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker is Black, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Asian Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker is Asian, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Hispanic Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker is Hispanic (including Puerto Rican), 0 otherwise. 
Worker Other Race Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker is of Other Race (including Native American), 0 otherwise. 
Worker No High School Degree Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker has not attained a high school degree, 0 otherwise. 
Worker High School Degree Dummy variable equaling 1 if a high school degree is worker‟s highest degree, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Bachelor’s Degree Dummy variable equaling 1 if a bachelor‟s degree is worker‟s highest degree, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Advanced Degree Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker has attained an advanced degree, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Division Size Number of workers in the worker‟s division. 
Worker Executive Management Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Executive Management, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Business Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Business, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Administrative Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Administrative, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Human Resources Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Human Resources, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Financial Development Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Financial Development, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Finance Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Finance, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Quality Assurance Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Quality Assurance, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Legal Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Legal, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Marketing Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Marketing, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Operations Distributions Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Operations/Distributions, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Manufacturing Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Manufacturing, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Sales Representation Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Sales Representation, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Sales Management Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Sales Management, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Research and Development Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Research and Development, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Electronic Data Processing Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Electronic Data Processing, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Health Care Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Health Care, 0 otherwise. 
Worker Scientific Affairs Dummy variable equaling 1 if worker‟s job function is Scientific Affairs, 0 otherwise. 
Year89-Year94 Dummy variable equaling 1 in the current year, 0 otherwise. 
 
